Charged by the market : electricity deregulation is finally starting to stir up retail competition in Maryland by Vanessa Sumo
I
n Maryland, residen-





six years. Beginning in
July, the average house-
hold was told it could
expect to pay 72 percent,
or $743 a year, more 
for electricity supplied 
by Baltimore Gas &
Electric (BGE). This 
wasn’t how deregulation
of the Maryland elec-
tricity  industry was
supposed to work out.
Residential customers
had been assured that
retail prices would go down as a result
of competition — but prices instead
leapt upward.  
BGE’s industrial customers likewise
experienced a rate increase, of up to 
39 percent for small- and medium-
sized businesses. BGE no longer sells
electricity to large commercial cus-
tomers because alternative suppliers
have taken over that market. Rate caps
for all industrial customers expired
two years ago, and since then they
have been paying the market rates. 
The electricity industry is the last
major energy sector to move to 
competition. For a long time, 
electricity’s traditional monopoly
structure was thought to be the most
efficient and inexpensive way to 
provide power. The long-held belief
was that utilities which owned massive
generating plants, combined with their
transmission and distribution systems,
possessed the scale needed to make
average production costs much lower
than smaller power plants could
achieve. Over time, how-
ever, changes in the




due to large utility 
construction and fuel
costs, as well as new laws
that facilitated the entry
of smaller power pro-
ducers prompted the 








nents of a vertically integrated
monopoly could potentially give way
to many suppliers of generation capac-
ity and many retailers of electricity
services. A competitive wholesale 
market for electricity would give 
generators the incentive to control
costs, to innovate, and to shift the
risks of expensive investments to
stockholders and away from con-
sumers. Retail competition would
support this arrangement by giving
consumers the choice to buy from the
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One of Maryland’s main electricity distribution companies is Baltimore
Gas & Electric (headquarters shown here), which plays an important role
in advancing retail competition by connecting competitive electricity
providers to homes and businesses in its area.
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and quality. The hope is that in the
long run, this new structure, along
with reforms in the regulated distribu-
tion and transmission aspects of the
business, would not only lead to lower
costs and lower prices but also
enhance the reliability of the whole
system. 
However, until recently in
Maryland — six years after retail 
competition was opened to residential
customers — consumer choice was
very limited. This may have more to 
do with how the state implemented
retail competition than with problems
with deregulation itself. Maryland’s
experience illustrates the difficulties
that most states, including some of 
its Fifth District neighbors, have had
with moving along the path of deregu-
lation. But things are starting to
change. Maryland’s current transition
to market-based prices, however reluc-
tant, seems to have finally ushered in
the start of true competition.  
Switching Blues
With retail competition, a customer’s
electricity bill is unbundled into a reg-
ulated and a competitive component.
The regulated component contains
the “delivery” charges for the trans-
mission of electricity from the
generation source to the local utility
and its distribution through poles and
wires to every home. The competitive
component is the essential part of
retail competition. Households are
free to choose whether to buy their
electricity from their incumbent 
local utility or from an alternative 
electricity provider. This gives them
the opportunity to shop around for a
supplier that can give them the most
savings and satisfaction.
The incumbent utility is typically
required to provide a standard default
service until the retail market fully
develops. The price that the utility
charges for this default service is the
“price-to-compare.” While the precise
rules vary across states, the price-to-
compare is usually computed by taking
the utility’s regulated cost of generat-
ing electricity and removing the
“stranded” costs, or costs incurred by
the utility while it was still a monopoly
but that it can no longer recover if 
customers switch to an alternative
provider. This residual, plus a transmis-
sion charge that all suppliers have to
pay, is the price-to-compare. When
shopping for an electricity supplier,
customers can take this price and 
compare it with what alternative
providers have to offer. Similarly, the
price-to-compare is the alternative
providers’ “price-to-beat,” or what they
can use to determine if there is suffi-
cient headroom for them to compete.
New entrants have access to the
transmission system owned by the
incumbent utilities, allowing them to
supply electricity in a particular area.
The incumbents charge the alternative
suppliers a fee for this service, which
in turn is collected from the customer.
The Federal Energy Commission,
which regulates the interstate trans-
mission of electricity, sets the price
that the incumbents can charge for
using their lines. 
An important yardstick of whether
competition is proceeding smoothly is
whether there is a good number 
of alternative providers active in the 
market and whether a significant 
proportion of customers are buying
electricity from these new entrants.
Customers are likely to switch if the
price offered by alternatives is lower
than the incumbent utility’s price-to-
compare. But in many states that
adopted retail competition, the 
potential savings from moving to 
an alternative was either too low or 
did not exist at all. 
The states’ electricity restructuring
laws did not make matters easy for
new entrants. Through separate deals
made with incumbent utilities, the
price of residential electricity supply
in Maryland was cut by 3 percent to 
7.5 percent, depending on the service
area, and frozen at that rate for four 
to eight years. 
Maryland’s Fifth District neighbors
embarked on similar programs. When
the District of Columbia opened to
retail competition in January 2001,
electricity prices of residential 
customers served by the Potomac
Electric Power Company (PEPCO)
were cut by 7 percent, and generation
and transmission rates were capped 
for four years until February 2005 
and until February 2007 for low-
income households. Virginia, which
introduced customer choice in 
January 2002, capped the incumbents’
electricity prices until the end of 2010
(extended from 2007), but allowed
some fuel and base rate adjustments.  
The idea behind the rate reduc-
tions and price caps was to protect
consumers, especially households,
from high unregulated rates during a
transition period. What is hard to
understand, however, is how the 
market would be expected to flourish
if alternative service providers were
not given sufficient headroom to 
compete. In many states, “the default
service price had been set at a 
level that didn’t track market prices 
so there was no reason to switch,” 
says Paul Joskow, an economist at 
the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. Soaring prices of fuels
burned to make electricity, particularly
natural gas, have exacerbated this 
gap, moving wholesale electricity
prices further away from the incum-
bent utilities’ standard rates. The
incumbents did not incur significant
losses during the rate freeze because
they were able to buy long-term 
contracts that fixed the wholesale
price of electricity over several years
until the caps expired.  
While Maryland is already in the
process of unfreezing rates, Joskow
says that the incumbents’ price-to-
compare was initially set below the
wholesale price, giving alternative
providers no incentive to enter the
market. For example, BGE’s price-to-
compare prior to moving to market
rates in July 2006 was about 4.7 cents
per kilowatt hour (including a small
transmission charge), while the 
forward wholesale price for power
delivered at the region’s wholesale
market and grid operator was about 
7.8 cents. Clearly, alternative providers
will find it difficult to buy power at 
7.8 cents and sell it at 4.7 cents. 
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consequences. As of June 2006, only
1.4 percent of all residential customers
in Maryland had signed up with an
alternative electricity provider, and
virtually all were in PEPCO’s service
area where rate caps were lifted two
years earlier. Elsewhere in the Fifth
District, about 1.5 percent of D.C.
households had switched to an alterna-
tive, down from the 6 percent share
alternatives enjoyed when rates were
uncapped in February 2005. Only one
alternative provider serves residential
customers in Virginia, and its share is
virtually zero.
These experiences compare unfa-
vorably to Texas, where 15 percent of
residential customers have already
switched to an alternative provider
after only three years of retail compe-
tition. One big difference is that
Texas, which adopted a program 
similar to the United Kingdom’s 
successful model, set the price-to-
compare at or above wholesale market
levels, leaving additional headroom for
competitive suppliers to enter the
market.
Despite these problems in the 
residential market, retail competition
has proved a success for commercial
and industrial customers. About 16.4
percent of Maryland’s businesses,
whose rate caps expired at the end
2004, have migrated to an alternative
provider as of June 2006. This repre-
sents about 63 percent of their 
total electricity load. Size certainly
matters. Big commercial and industrial
customers tend to be the first ones to
shop since a bigger electricity bill
means that they will be keener to save.
And since buying a trainload rather
than a truckload of a commodity can
often fetch a lower price, alternative
electricity providers are able to offer
better discounts to bigger customers
because it’s more cost-effective to 
handle a larger load. 
Following the Wholesale Market 
When states across the country were
debating whether to move to a 
competitive model, the main selling
point was the promise of lower prices.
But assessing whether retail competi-
tion has led to lower prices today is
trickier than it seems. One reason is
that rate freezes and reductions
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Retail Electricity Competition in Maryland
There are six alternative electricity suppliers that are actively seeking new residential customers. The area served by Baltimore Gas &
Electric, which uncapped rates in July 2006, has the most number of market players. Many of those companies are also looking to do 
business in other parts of the state.
SOURCE:Maryland Public Service Commission Web site as of October 2006
Baltimore Gas & Electric Company
• Commerce Energy
• Dominion Retail
• Maryland Energy Consortium
• Ohms Energy Company
• Pepco Energy Services
• Washington Gas Energy Services
Potomac Electric Power Company
• Ohms Energy Company
• Pepco Energy Services
• Washington Gas Energy Services
Delmarva Power
• Ohms Energy Company
Allegheny Power
• There are no alternative providers.
Southern Maryland Electric Cooperative
• There are no alternative providers.
Choptank Electric Cooperative
• There are no alternative providers.
Electric Utilities In Maryland
INVESTOR OWNED SYSTEMS
MUNICIPAL SYSTEMS
RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE SYSTEMS






























Potomac Electric Power Company
Berlin Municipal Electric Company
The Easton Utilities Commission
Hagerstown Municipal Electric Light Plant
St. Michaels Utilities Commission
A&N Electric Cooperative
Choptank Electric Cooperative
Somerset Rural Electric Cooperative
Southern Maryland Electric Cooperative
Thurmont Municipal Light Company
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utilities have blurred the picture, since
prices indeed fell but not because of
retail competition itself. 
Another way to compare competi-
tive and regulated prices would be 
to look at the change in prices in 
those states that have opened to 
retail competition and subsequently
uncapped rates, and those that have
not introduced competition. Using
this measure, economist Kenneth
Rose of the Institute of Public
Utilities at Michigan State University
finds that retail prices have risen by
15.8 percent over the period 2002 to
2005 in states which have moved to
market-based rates. This is faster than
the 12.3 percent increase in areas that
are still regulated.
Rose attributes higher prices to 
the workings of wholesale electricity 
markets rather than to retail competi-
tion. “When Maryland [holds] their
auction, the price they are going to get
is largely a function of the conditions
that are out there in the wholesale
market, and if the wholesale market is
showing any kind of problem that
might lead to higher prices then that’s
going to be reflected in the retail,” 
he says. 
Retail suppliers take their cue from
the price that clears the demand and
supply for electricity in the wholesale
market. The resulting price will at
times be very high because under very
tight conditions, the wholesale price is
set by the generating plant that is
called on to supply the last unit of 
electricity demanded. If that plant
uses natural gas (as it does today), 
then the price retailers will pay for
electricity depends solely on the price
of natural gas, even if the electricity
comes from other cheaper generation
sources. 
Under a regulated regime, the
monopolist’s electricity price depends
on the utility’s average cost of produc-
ing electricity. This is determined
mainly by the variable cost of fuel
expenses and the fixed cost of building
plants that generate the electricity. 
In this case, an increase in natural gas
prices affects electricity prices only in
proportion to the share of natural gas
in producing that electricity. Thus, in
contrast to a deregulated system, 
consumers will experience smaller
fluctuations in electricity prices. 
As far as price-conscious con-
sumers are concerned, this might
sound like an argument in favor of 
regulation. But Joskow argues that the
upside of competition is that prices
fall whenever there is excess genera-
tion capacity, while in a regulated
system, prices rise because utilities are
allowed to recover the fixed costs of
building increased capacity, even if it
turns out to be a bad investment.
Thus, wholesale prices can be higher
or lower than a monopolist’s price, but
electricity rates under competition
will always track the changes in the
cost of energy more closely. There is
some concern today about future
shortages of electricity supply due to
plant retirements and inadequate
investments, and the expectation is
that market prices will provide the
incentive to construct new generation
capacity. 
ANew Optimism
When BGE’s rates were placed under
caps, the company survived the rate
freeze (even as wholesale market
prices were rising) by purchasing 
long-term fixed-price contracts for all
of their residential obligations. The
assumption was that the rate caps
would come off July 2006, and prices
from then on would closely track 
the market. Similarly, alternative 
electricity providers eager to serve 
the BGE’s service area were gearing 
up to enter a new arena. 
But an outcry over the very steep
rate hike persuaded regulators to limit
BGE’s standard rate increase to a mere
15 percent, forcing the company to
borrow money to make up for the 
difference and to collect on this 
debt by charging every household a
few dollars every month for 10 years
beginning January 2007. The promise
now is that customers will pay full
market rates by January 2008. 
Even so, lawmakers made sure that
retail competition would not be
affected. “Legislators went out of their
way so as not to harm the market,” says
Wayne Harbaugh, BGE manager of
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Electricity retail competition and
restructuring programs first took shape 
in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
California in 1998, and then spread to
about a dozen other states a few years
later. But the yearlong California power
crisis in the summer of 2000 as well as 
revelations of manipulation strategies in
wholesale markets took the luster off of
competitive reforms.
Although it is arguable whether these
events were due to problems inherent in
deregulation, it did prompt many states to
rethink their plans. Since then, no other
state has announced plans to deregulate,
and others have simply abandoned,
delayed, or significantly scaled back 
implementation. California and Arizona
eventually suspended retail competition.
Arkansas and New Mexico repealed 
their competition laws. Oklahoma and
West Virginia both passed legislation to
introduce retail competition but never
implemented it. 
More than half of the states are show-
ing very little interest. North Carolina 
and South Carolina considered retail
access several years ago but are no longer
discussing the possibility of competitive
reforms in the electricity sector.  As whole-
sale market prices rose above regulated
prices due to the rising costs of fuel, retail
competition became less appealing, 
especially in states with relatively low 
regulated prices such as in the Carolinas.
“Retail competition will not help when
your prices are reasonably low,” says Tom
Lam, a senior engineer with the North
Carolina Utilities Commission.
The sluggish pace of switching to 
competitive suppliers and the uncertainty
of lower prices in states that have adopted
retail competition is another reason 
why  other states have shelved plans to
restructure the electricity sector. For now,
these states seem content to wait and see
whether retail competition does indeed
deliver its promised benefits. —VANESSA SUMO
Status of State Retail
Competition
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was accomplished by charging the full
72 percent price increase on the 
customer’s bill and then by giving a
credit on the same bill that brings this
down to 15 percent. Customers can
take this credit even if they move to an
alternative provider, which means that
they will incur a price increase of not
more than 15 percent, depending on
how much savings they can get with an
alternative supplier.  
However, outrage over the 72 per-
cent hike has prompted calls to look
into the possibility of reverting to a
regulated market. This uncertainty
may have held back consumers from
switching to alternative suppliers.
“[Customers] were unsure as to
whether some future legislative or 
regulatory action would ultimately
prove to be a better deal than compet-
itive supply. That uncertainty made
many customers reluctant to accept
cheaper competitive supply offers,”
says Kimberly August, director of reg-
ulatory and external affairs for
Washington Gas Energy Services, an
electricity provider. Moreover, some
alternative electricity providers may
have hesitated to enter the market.
“One thing that may have given the
suppliers pause is the uncertainty that
was in the legislative and regulatory
arena in this past year; they just
weren’t quite sure what was going to
come out of the legislature,” says
Harbaugh.
This ‘pressure cooker’ effect and its
accompanying pop in rates will be
closely watched in states preparing to
shed their own price caps. Virginia’s
18 Region Focus • Fall 2006
In the brave new world of electricity
markets, the price that residential
customers will pay for every kilowatt-
hour of electricity can vary along
with hourly movements in wholesale
markets. Each household will be able
to view real-time electricity prices,
check the running total on their
monthly bill every day, and choose to
shift their consumption of power-
guzzling appliances away from
higher-priced periods or reduce their
use altogether. Metering will no
longer be the dull activity of
manually reading a mechan-
ical device once a month
but of sending and receiv-
ing data through a
wireless communication
link several times a day. 
It may come sooner than
we think. Potomac Electric
Power Company (PEPCO)
together with the District of
Columbia Public Service Commission
and three other independent groups
are planning to introduce Smart-
PowerDC, a program that allows
residential customers to manage 
electricity consumption and poten-
tially lower their bills by using a “smart
meter.” 
Each of the 2,250 D.C. homes 
participating in the two-year pilot
project will be fitted with a meter
that can measure electricity use 
every 15 minutes and transmit this 
information to PEPCO. Half of the
participants will also receive a “smart
thermostat” that can, by means of
radio signals, remotely raise or lower
the temperature of an air conditioner
or central heating system during
exceptionally hot or cold days, when
the price of electricity tends to be
very high. It’s up to the customer to
reset the temperature to a more 
comfortable level, but they will be
warned by real-time electricity prices
displayed on the thermostat that
doing so will raise their bill.
The pilot program









tomers based on hourly
rates that are set a day before
in the wholesale market. Households
who choose Critical Peak Pricing 
pay substantially higher rates during
critical peak periods, about 60 or 
so hours throughout the year. For
instance, the critical peak rate 
during the summertime can be about
64 cents, but only 6.5 cents during
nonpeak periods. The final option,
Critical Peak Rebate, charges the
standard rate, but customers are
allowed to earn rebates by voluntarily
reducing consumption during critical
peak periods. PEPCO expects to
install the first smart meters before
the end of the year.
Guided by price signals, smart
meters put information and control
in the hands of the consumers. Not
everyone will be able to save money
by using the smart meter, as some 
can simply choose to continue to
consume the same amount of 
electricity even during higher-priced
periods. “Those that are imposing
the greatest costs on the system 
will be paying the highest prices,”
says Steve Sunderhauf, manager 
for program evaluations at PEPCO
Holdings. But there is potential for
significant savings for those who are
more responsive to price changes. 
Moreover, if this technology
becomes widely used, a demand
response to retail prices can 
ultimately have a moderating effect
on prices in wholesale markets. 
“The piece of the market that is 
missing is the demand side,” says
Sunderhauf. As consumers shift 
electricity use from peak to off-peak
periods, the prices in these two 
periods will also begin to narrow and
create a smoother and flatter pricing
schedule.
And there’s the environmental
impact too. Saving energy can help
reduce global warming by burning
less fossil fuel for generating 
electricity. That’s three cheers for 
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be watching. Alternative providers
contemplating entering the market
will be on guard since companies will
be reluctant to make large investments
if there is a possibility that regulations
can suddenly change the rules of the
game. What may bode well for the
state, however, is that they’re phasing
in some fuel and base rate adjustments
early on, which may make the eventual
pop easier to bear.
Amid all this drama, alternative
providers in Maryland seem unfazed.
The evidence is in the activity cur-
rently taking place. “There are more 
competitors coming in which is a good
sign. We’re seeing prices at lower than
the utility’s standard offer so there’s
robust competition. [This is] good for
the end user in the long run,” says Skip
Trimble, a senior consultant at BTU
Energy, an electricity provider work-
ing as an agent for Commerce Energy.
At the moment, there are 23 licensed
providers in the BGE area and six 
listed as actively seeking new residen-
tial customers on the Maryland Public
Service Commission’s Web site.
Trimble thinks that most are offering
prices that average 7 percent to 11 per-
cent below the standard offer rates. 
With both the residential and 
commercial sectors now open to retail
competition and offering market-based
rates, the market has been given a much
needed boost. “We are seeing quite a
pickup in activity,” says Harbaugh.
“[Right] now we have 26 retail suppliers
[residential and commercial] that are
licensed and doing business in our terri-
tory so it has been a dramatic pickup in
the last couple of months.”  
Alternative suppliers are able to
offer competitive rates through their
business strategies as well as a rule that
binds how BGE can buy electricity
from the wholesale market. As BGE
moved out of the transition period, bid-
ding rules required the utility to go to
auction on three different dates from
December 2005 to February 2006. 
Not only did everyone know that
BGE was going to go out shopping at
these specific dates, but the electricity
prices in the wholesale market at that
time were very high. But if the acquisi-
tion of electricity were handled like a
real portfolio, as a manager would 
handle mutual funds, then alternative
providers can beat that price, and
that’s where the expertise comes in.
“They wouldn’t buy on three days 
during the year, they would look each
and every day if there’s a bargain,” 
says Trimble. “[But] that was not the 
utility’s fault, that was legislative in
nature,” he adds.
Apart from carefully managing
their electricity supply portfolio, BTU
Energy’s fundamental strategy, as well
as that of others, is to bring together as
many households and other small cus-
tomers as possible into buying groups.
By aggregating individual accounts
and serving a larger load, competitive
suppliers can get the scale they need to
buy energy in bulk and offer better
prices to smaller customers. Although
incumbent utilities like BGE do effec-
tively act as an aggregator for those
customers who choose not to shop,
Harbaugh explains that in Maryland,
these utilities are very passive in the
marketplace and simply act as a
provider of last resort for those who
have not yet chosen to switch to an
alternative provider. Incumbent 
utilities are not allowed to actively
solicit customers, nor are they permit-
ted to pursue an aggregation strategy.
Competition Brick by Brick 
Has deregulation failed? It might 
be easy to conclude so based on 
rising electricity prices in deregulated
markets. But this would not be a fair
assessment in many ways. With rate
caps slowly coming off, it seems that
deregulation may only be beginning in
earnest in Maryland and other parts of
the Fifth District, so that the benefits
of competition could still be forthcom-
ing. Lower prices will depend in part on
how robust competition will be, and on
this point we will have to wait awhile. 
Prices will depend on market con-
ditions for fuel prices as well. “People
need to understand that in a competi-
tive market prices go up and they go
down and that when you have a fuel
price shock, you’re going to see 
potentially large effects on the elec-
tricity commodity, either up or down,”
says Joskow. Though retail prices may
not change with the same frequency,
they will follow wholesale markets
more closely. In the future, Joskow
hopes to see retail contracts that
would allow households to choose to
what extent they want to track move-
ments in the wholesale market. This
feature would be important in over-
coming households’ natural aversion
to uncertainty — many families would
be willing to potentially pay a few
extra dollars more in exchange for a
consistently predictable power bill. 
And there is a value in electricity
prices reflecting market prices. With-
out an appropriate market signal,
households are shielded from the true
cost of electricity that prevents them
from making intelligent consumption
decisions. When the wholesale price
of electricity starts rising, as it has 
in the past years, households will 
only consume less if they are asked to
pay for the market price. Collectively, 
this makes for better use of electricity
and allows more people to enjoy the 
benefits of this resource.
Moreover, in well-functioning retail
and wholesale markets, a demand
response at the retail level would rever-
berate back to the wholesale market,
making the overall electricity demand
and supply balance as well as the price
more stable. Retail price caps were one
factor that exacerbated the power 
crisis in California six years ago
because it increasingly detached 
customers from the reality of higher
costs of electricity, particularly at a
time of severe scarcity. As wholesale
prices rose, incumbent utilities had to
operate at a loss because the caps did
not permit them to charge customers
prices that reflected the increasing
costs. The incumbents were also 
discouraged from purchasing long-
term contracts to lock in wholesale
prices. As their financial condition
worsened, the incumbents had little
choice but to interrupt power service
on several occasions.
But price is not the only dimension
of competition. If prices are set in the
Fall 2006 • Region Focus 19
RF Fall v23  10/30/06  2:17 PM  Page 19wholesale market so retailers are simi-
larly affected, then much of the
benefit may come from offering 
differentiated products to customers
at various prices, similar to the experi-
ence in the telephone and securities
industries. So far, alternative elec-
tricity providers have been offering
various shades of “green,” energy 
produced by some combination of
renewable sources from hydroelectric
plants, solar panels, wind farms, and
biomass fuels. Other innovations
could stretch in different directions,
including products which offer 
standard electricity but at various 
levels of price risk, quality and relia-
bility, depending on what customers
prefer and are willing to pay for. 
One also has to take account of
what the costs would have been in a
regulated world with some of the prob-
lems that existed back then. People
forget that an important part of why
restructuring was pursued in the first
place was because under a regulated
regime, consumers were asked to pay
for large generation construction cost
overruns. With competition, investors
bear the risk of these “mistakes,” not
the ratepayers.
If legislators are intent on going
down the road of retail competition,
the first thing that needs to be done is
to allow prices to rise to market levels.
While the sudden hike in retail prices
in the BGE service area was painful for
some, the eventual increase was
inevitable. Capping rates for too long
or not allowing some adjustments in
the meantime would only make the
eventual transition to market-based
rates more painful.
Another necessary step, according
to Craig Goodman, president of 
the National Energy Marketers
Association, a nonprofit trade associa-
tion representing wholesale and retail
marketers of energy, is that the 
incumbent utilities should no longer
provide competitive products and
services that the market can supply at 
a better price. In other words, retail
supply services like billing and 
collection (which the incumbents 
provide) should no longer be a 
monopoly function.
One could argue that it seems inap-
propriate for the incumbent, who is in
fact a competitor of the alternative
provider, to bill and collect on behalf
of its competitors. But according to
BGE’s Harbaugh, Maryland is one of
the few states that have already
opened billing and metering to 
competition. Even so, most alternative
providers still choose the incumbents’
billing and metering services because
nobody else can beat the prices they
charge. For this reason, Harbaugh
believes that most alternatives would
not want the incumbent to get out of
these businesses.
Informing households about how
retail competition works is another
stumbling block for new entrants.
Most customers still don’t know how
retail competition works and how they
can save money by switching suppliers,
according to Sheirmiar White, founder
of Ohms Energy, an electricity provider
who operates in Maryland. White says
that it costs his company about $40 to
$50 to persuade a residential customer
to switch over, a relatively small
amount since it can come to as much as
$200 for other alternative providers.
Goodman agrees. “One of the highest
costs of competitive services is acquir-
ing the customer away from a 100-year
monopoly that’s had 100 percent of the
market share,” says Goodman.
Surely there will be at least some
“sticky” behavior on the part of con-
sumers because the perceived costs
associated with switching are high.
However, once information barriers
come down and the conditions are
right, people will begin to choose the
electricity service provider that best
meets their needs. 
But the sluggishness seems to
reside among the legislators as well.
Some states that have dipped their
toes in restructuring the electricity
sector have not had the determination
to go with it all the way. The hesitation
is understandable but a choice has to
be made. When it comes to electricity
deregulation, there is no stopping
halfway. If retail competition is the
goal, then the key to success is 
making sure the right incentives are 
in place.  RF
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